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Reply to Margolis, Madelrieux and
Levine
Cheryl Misak
1 Allow me to begin by thanking these three commentators for the time and energy they
have put into thinking about the issues I raise in The American Pragmatists.1 There are
some important common themes in their reading of the book and I am grateful for the
opportunity to address them, and to clarify and expand on what I wrote.
2 One thing that common to all three readers is that they see me as offering, in Stéphane
Madelrieux’s words, a history of pragmatism that is both descriptive and normative – one
which shows “that pragmatism has never been eclipsed from the philosophical scene
even during the heyday of logical empiricism.” In Steven Levine’s words, I argue that
“pragmatism was not simply killed off by analytical philosophy but was absorbed by it in
complex  ways.”  And  Joseph  Margolis  has  me  offering  both  a  “textualist”  and  a
“genealogical” account of the trajectory of American pragmatism. His summary of my
position is as follows:
I take Misak to be recommending that we let James swim for himself and that we
concede  (as  we  must)  that  Dewey  never  quite  gets  it  right  (philosophically)  in
explicating  his  “problematic  situation”  –  the  key  to  his  attempt  to  distinguish
pragmatism from untenable forms of realism and idealism; and that, accordingly,
we  should  adopt  Peirce’s  resolution  of  the  pragmatist  puzzle  (which  Dewey
ultimately, though mistakenly, believes he’s pretty well already adopted).
3 All of these descriptions of my project in The American Pragmatists seem right to me – they
capture the central aim of the book nicely.
4 The commentators, of course, do not however agree on everything. For instance, Levine
and Madelrieux think I have not been charitable to James and Margolis thinks that I have
James right. Margolis, on the other hand, thinks that I have not seen the important lesson
that Dewey drew for us, and Levine is more amenable to my account of Dewey.
5 But they do share a view about what they see as problematic in The American Pragmatists.
Madelrieux objects to what he describes as my dividing up pragmatism in terms of “a
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good trend going from Charles Sanders Peirce to Clarence Irving Lewis and Wilfrid Sellars
and a bad trend going from William James and John Dewey to Richard Rorty.” He argues:
“While it is indisputable that critics of pragmatism have focused on truth, this does not
entail that truth is the best thread to understand the development of pragmatism. It is
certainly not the only one.” Levine has me claiming that James and Dewey thought that
there is  no truth and objectivity to be had anywhere and he argues that  the divide
between them and the more objectivist pragmatists is not nearly so neat as I would have
it.  Margolis  thinks  I  “miss  the  essential  key”  in  pragmatism by  following  Russell  in
making pragmatism’s theory of truth and knowledge its primary feature and that I fail to
appreciate how Dewey, in the end, successfully resolved the mystery of how the situation
itself could be doubtful.
6 A one line summary of these worries about the general project might read as follows:
Misak’s focus on the issue of truth misses something important about pragmatism and,
anyway, the divide she identifies and traces along the lines of truth is not such that each
of the classical pragmatists fall neatly on one side or the other of it. Let me address these
general worries before going on to some of the more specific arguments made by the
commentators.
7 First,  I  fully  acknowledge  that  my focus  on truth  and objectivity  is  but  one  way of
approaching the tradition of pragmatism. The reason I chose this angle into the tradition
is that my aim was to tell the story of the trajectory of American pragmatism: how it
began, how it was received, how it evolved, and what became of it. I tried to make clear in
the Preface:
The  early  pragmatists  made  major  contributions  to  almost  every  branch  of
philosophy and to other fields of investigation—for instance, Peirce in logic and the
theory of signs; James in psychology; Dewey in education. But my focus in this book
will  be  on  what  Bertrand  Russell  calls  “the  cardinal  point  in  the  pragmatist
philosophy” – “its theory of truth.”.. It is the view of truth and knowledge that is
most associated with pragmatism and marks it off from other traditions. Indeed,
the reader might take this  book to have an implicit  subtitle:  Truth,  Knowledge,
Value. It may be that much that is interesting in some of the pragmatists’ work lies
elsewhere. But the story I am tracing is the story of pragmatism as a recognizable
tradition  and  I  will  leave  it  to  others  to  show in  a  sophisticated  way  how,  for
instance, James forever changed the face of psychology. (x)
8 So there is much that I leave out of my account, especially when that material never
resonated with those who were weighing in on whether pragmatism was a view that
ought to be adopted or not. For instance, as Madelrieux notes, I say relatively little about
action, a concept central to pragmatist thought. He is most certainly right – it would be
good to expand on how the pragmatists started from the model of inquiry which has at its
core the settlement of habits of belief, and moved on to how we evaluate those habits of
belief in terms of whether they lead to successful action. I intend to speak to this strong
current in pragmatism in my next project, which will (in part) look at how pragmatism
evolved in the hands of Frank Ramsey.
9 But,  again,  the  philosophical  community  was  mostly  interested  in  pragmatism’s
conception of truth, knowledge and value, and so that is the focus of my concern in the
book. As I say on page 3, at the heart of my story is the fact that James was the one to
unveil pragmatism to the public – in a lecture in California in 1898 – and remained its
most prominent proponent. Philosophy, James said in Pragmatism, “is at once the most
sublime and the most trivial of human pursuits. It works in the minutest crannies and it
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opens out the widest vistas” (3). I argue that in on his work on psychology, he worked
brilliantly both in the crannies and on the vistas, but when it came to talking about truth
and objectivity, he was less reliable. It was Peirce who worked on both the careful details
as well as opening out the panoramic views. His version of pragmatism, however, hardly
saw the light of day, much to pragmatism’s misfortune.
10 The pragmatism that  was under the spotlight was James’s  “The Will  to Believe” and
Pragmatism. Here James argues that “Any idea upon which we can ride… any idea that will
carry us prosperously from any one part of our experience to any other part, linking
things  satisfactorily,  working  securely,  simplifying,  saving  labor,  is…  true
instrumentally.” “Satisfactorily,” for James, “means more satisfactorily to ourselves, and
individuals will emphasize their points of satisfaction differently.” James concluded that
truth  “is  plastic”  (58).  Bertrand  Russell,  G. E.  Moore,  and  many  others  savaged  this
account of truth. Their objections, some terribly unfair and some of them completely fair,
remain at the fore today. Indeed, Peirce himself leveled some of them (the better ones)
against James. When I give a talk on pragmatism in philosophy departments in the US,
the UK or Europe, similar challenges are put me to time and time again. So, whatever the
merits  of  some of  James’s  other  work,  it  is  the  James  of  “The  Will  to  Believe”  and
Pragmatism that had a tremendous and negative effect on the fortunes of pragmatism.
Part of my project is to try to reverse those fortunes.
11 The reception of Dewey was also less than positive. Again, Russell is responsible for much
of the damage. I write:
Russell’s  main  reservation  is  that  Dewey’s  account  of  inquiry  seems  not  to  be
inquiry at all. It is not a “search for truth” or for right answers, but, in Dewey’s
words: inquiry is the “controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate
situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations
as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole.”.. Russell
notes that on this conception of inquiry, a drill sergeant who converts raw recruits
into a regiment or a bricklayer who transforms a pile of bricks into a structure must
be said to be successfully conducting inquiries. In inquiry, though, we are inquiring
into something – we are trying to find answers to questions. We are not trying to
transform one existential situation into another. (122)
12 I show that similar worries were articulated by Peirce and James. Russell was reacting to
something that was there to be reacted against. If we are to understand where and why
pragmatism is where it is today, we need to understand how the views of the classical
pragmatists were received and how James left himself open to criticism on the matter of
the plasticity of truth and how Dewey left himself open to criticism on the matter of
making good sense of his idea of a “problematic situation.” I like the way Levine puts the
point: “James and Dewey (and of course Rorty) do not do justice to the fact that truth is a
distinct norm of thought and inquiry that cannot be reduced to either warrantedness or
to what works (in the way of thought).”
13 Second,  I  very much hope that  I  did not  suggest  that  the divide I  trace is  perfectly
straightforward. James and Dewey, for instance, intended their pragmatism to do justice to
the objective  dimension of  human inquiry.  My argument  is  that,  despite  those  good
intentions,  more  often  than  not,  they  failed  to  make  sense  of  something’s  being
objectively right or wrong. They failed to give us an account of how we might adjudicate
between claims. I argue that James, in “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life” makes
good on that promise, but that his other work is in tension with that wonderful paper. My
suggestion is that Peirce is more consistent in avoiding the conclusion (or implication)
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that reality is an arbitrary construct of our own making. On Peirce’s view, truth is that
which would be indefeasible or would really stand up to the challenges of experience,
reason and inquiry. Hence there is sense to be made of better or worse views of reality, of
improving our beliefs in any domain of inquiry, and of being responsive to experience
and reason.
14 Nonetheless, I am very much open to the arguments that, at their best, James and Dewey,
like Peirce,  do indeed give coherent pragmatist  accounts of  the human aspiration to
getting things  right.  I  think that  Madelrieux is  on to something important  when he
speaks of James’s pragmatic vindication of free will (P. F. Strawson was on to the same
thing, via a Kantian route). And I very much like Levine’s account of how James takes us
to be constrained by the world in the way that a sculptor is constrained by the block of
marble he has in hand. But when Levine shows the side of James that has it that there are
multiple realities and worlds, one feels the James that I described, and that Russell railed
against, sneaking back onto the page.
15 Similarly,  Margolis  offers  us  an  account  of  Dewey’s  “enlanguaged  experience”  or
“metaphysically heuristic unity of subject and object” that sheds much light on Dewey
and, especially, on Ernst Nagel’s bewilderment with some of Dewey’s ideas. Margolis’s
first-person  account  of  Nagel’s  working  through  Dewey  in  his  famous  seminar  at
Columbia is fascinating and especially welcome. But again, in giving us that account, one
can easily see how someone like Nagel, who was Dewey’s graduate student and was well-
placed to understand him, found the more obscure Dewey re-entering the picture. While I
think that Margolis is right in seeing the key to Dewey to be his excellent idea that it
makes no sense to think of logic as reason-guiding if it is thought of a autonomous or
pulled apart from human interest and function, I  also think he is right in saying that
Dewey didn’t make the claim clearly enough or with enough knowledge of the logic of
which he was speaking. As Margolis puts it: Perhaps Dewey had simply not earned the
right to make his charge. Peirce, being a crackerjack logician, did earn the right to insist
that logic was a normative science, a way of evaluating habits of reasoning. Margolis
notes that this idea was picked up by other logicians. I would only add that the greatest
logician who picked it up, took the idea of a logic as a normative science directly and
explicitly  from Peirce  himself.  That  was  Frank  Ramsey.  In  a  note  to  his  interesting
discussion here, Margolis correctly surmises that in Cambridge Pragmatism, I will speak to
how philosophy cannot examine logic without viewing it as embedded in actual human
practices.
16 So, despite all variations in emphasis and in substance, let me be so bold as to suggest
that  there  is  much  the  three  readers  and  I  agree  upon  and  against  that  body  of
agreement, all sorts of fruitful conversations about what should be brought out in sharp
relief in the pragmatist tradition can be explored.
17 One of those fruitful conversations will be sparked by Levine’s illuminating account of
James on experience. He shows how Lewis’s account of thick experience is mirrored in
James, especially in The Principles of Psychology. There James argues that there is far more
information in the environment than we can utilize to prepare behavioral responses. We
are immersed in a chaotic stream of sensory data and must select from it. And of course
that selection involves bringing to that data our interests and concepts. Peirce, I would
argue, puts forward a similar view. But it is embedded in his doctrine of categories, and
thus is hard to extract and is less compelling than James’s account.
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18 Given that I think that much promise lies in that Lewisian account of experience, James
needs to get credit where credit is due. I shall make this correction in work that I am
currently  undertaking  on  Lewis.  And  I  shall  most  certainly  draw  on  Levine’s  fine
exposition of it.
19 Thus far, at least on my reading, all is well and good with the interfamilial issues that
occupy us, as pragmatists. But there is at least one idea that cannot, I think, be brought
into the arena of constructive disagreement. Madelrieux tries to land me with a bizarre
thought. He says:
the very practice of asserting and arguing presupposes that we aim to get things
right so that aiming to the truth is a regulative assumption of our very practice of
doing philosophy in an analytic way. In short, analytic philosophy as a mere style of
philosophy presupposes the very pragmatist (and very substantial) theory of truth
that she intends to promote.
20 If I understand him correctly, Madelrieux takes the idea that we might aspire to truth or
to getting things right to somehow be part and parcel of analytic philosophy. I suspect
this is, rather, Madelrieux’s own view – that analytic philosophy is the kind of philosophy
that upholds a substantial theory of truth. But this simply is not the case.  There are
plenty of analytic philosophers who argue that truth is nothing but disquotation or that
truth is redundant. In fact, many of them are set against my modest account of truth
because they think that it is too substantial.
21 I  do in fact argue that,  in the very practice of asserting or believing, we display our
commitment to aiming at the truth. Madelrieux says that this argument
tends  to  present  pragmatism’s  history  as  the  divide  between  a  kind  of  (good)
analytic pragmatism (of which Peirce is the main forerunner) and a kind of (bad)
continental pragmatism (of which Rorty is the main outcome). The divide within
pragmatism  would  then  be  but  the  repercussion  of  the  great  divide  between
analytic and continental philosophy: pragmatism would only be the American way
of dealing with this great divide. The conclusion is that pragmatism has brought
nothing essential to philosophy, so that nothing essential would have been lost if
America had not entered the philosophical scene.
22 This is all rather startling. For one thing, it is really not clear what we mean by “analytic
philosophy.”  Madelrieux accuses  me of  having an “ambiguous definition” of  analytic
philosophy. But on the first page, I think I am clear that there is very little sense these
days to attempt any definition of this concept or method:
“Analytic philosophy” used to have a clear meaning when in the hands of the likes
of Bertrand Russell: “logical analysis” was the attempt to clarify a concept by using
formal methods to reduce it to its constituent parts. It might have been the case
that for some years in the mid to late 1900s, pragmatists had reason to distinguish
themselves from that kind of analysis and from a kind of finely wrought philosophy
which they took to be irrelevant to the problems we actually face in the world. But
logical analysis has come and gone as a way of doing philosophy. Perhaps “analytic
philosophy”  now  suggests  to  some  that  the  philosophy  of  language  is  the
foundation of philosophy; perhaps that logic is the foundation of philosophy. But it
is more realistic to think that the term has lost any precise meaning it once had (1).
23 Or, as I put in later in the book, Sellars rightly objected to the idea that the task of the
philosopher is “analysis in the sense of definition – the task, so to speak, of ‘making little
ones  out  of  big  ones’.”  This  “atomistic  philosophy,”  Sellars  says,  “is  a  snare  and  a
delusion” (221). But once we say that about analytic philosophy, there is not much else we
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can say. Madelrieux needs to tell us why on earth we would accept such a particular and
burdened account of it as the one he suggests.
24 So let me end by setting the record straight. I do not think that it is helpful to view the
interfamilial disputes that have been part of pragmatism since its inception through the
lens of the analytic-continental distinction. Part of my aim in The American Pragmatists
was to show that, as I put it on (226): “The very categories of analytic versus Continental
philosophy,  over the last  decades,  have been disintegrating.” But if  others,  including
Madelrieux, want to approach the matter from that perspective, then it is of course open
to them to produce alternative accounts of the history and trajectory of pragmatism. But
in  doing  so,  they  should,  I  think,  take  account  of  the  engagements  between  the
pragmatists and those so-called analytic enemies of pragmatism – Russell,  the logical
empiricists, Quine, Davidson, and so on. I suspect that they too will feel the categories
shifting and sliding until there is very little left of them.
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